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accept work on Saturday was struck down when chal- 
lenged by a Seventh Day Adventist whose religion 
mandated a Saturday Sabbath. So, too, the parents in 
Mobile are claiming that the secular curriculum man- 
dated by the school board serves to coerce their chil- 
dren into adopting a worldview inconsistent with their 
religious beliefs, and in so doing to undermine the 
freedom of families to follow their own religion. 
O n  the surface, establishment and free enterprise 
appear to raise separate constitutional issues. In fact, 
they are intractably interdependent. The Louisiana case, 
for example, originated with the experience of Senator 
Keith's son, who, in effect, had his religious belief ruled 
"unsatisfactory," surely an experience that implicates 
free exercise values. Keith's response was to sponsor 
legislation that would take the burden off of his son by 
placing his religious beliefs right there in the classroom 
as a parallel version of science. Yet that move triggered 
an establishment clause problem, since the state had 
acted to advance the interests of a particular religious 
viewpoint. Inevitably, protection of "free exercise" as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment requires some 
degree of that "establishment" which the First Amend- 
ment simultaneously prohibits. Moreover, what is ulti- 
mately at stake in resolving establishment clause issues 
may be free exercise values-in Louisiana, those of 
nonfundamentalists who feel, with some justification, 
threatened and coerced by the political success of a 
fundamentalist program. Thus, the free exercise rights 
of Senator Keith and his family stand in contradiction 
to those of nonfundamentalists, mediated only by the 
murk of modern establishment clause doctrine. 
Similarly contradictory are the issues raised by the 
Mobile case. Every time someone claims a free exercise 
exemption from otherwise valid rules or practices, es- 
tablishment clause issues arise immediately. To exempt 
anyone on religious grounds automatically prioritizes 
that claim against others denied the exemption. To use 
the example mentioned earlier, why should the Seventh 
Day Adventist be relieved from Saturday work, but not 
someone who wants to sleep late or to spend more time 
with children? The answer, which seems to violate the 
establishment clause, must be that claims rooted in 
religion are more important than those lacking such a 
foundation. 
t gets even worse. Not every claim, even if rooted 
in the most deeply held religious belief, will be 
granted. Every grant increases the level of admin- 
istrative inconvenience; many claims will inevitably be 
denied, producing a hierarchy of religious beliefs and 
practices, with some considered worthy of accommoda- 
tion and others considered not so worthy. The result is 
the establishment clause problem of favoring particular 
religions and disfavoring others. Jews, for example, 
have been on the losing side of some notable (and 
infamous) cases, such as the one decided two years 
before the Seventh Day Adventist case, which refused 
to exempt an Orthodox Jew from a Sunday closing law, 
or the one decided in 1986 (opinion by Justice Rehn- 
quist) refusing to exempt an Orthodox Jewish psy- 
chologist from Air Force dress rules to the extent of 
letting him wear his yarmulke while on duty in a mili- 
tary hospital. 
Thus, to validate the claim of the parents in the 
Mobile case would serve to exalt their religious dissatis- 
faction with the public school curriculum over other 
dissenting voices not rooted in similar religious belief. 
One way to avoid the implicit establishment clause 
problem is to transform the free exercise claim of 
exemption into an establishment clause challenge to 
the very validity of the government practice. That is 
exactly what happened in Mobile, where the complain- 
ants chose to challenge the ostensibly secular school 
curriculum as in fact dogmatically indoctrinating their 
children with the "religion" of "secular humanism," in 
violation of the establishment clause. 
Since there is nothing fixed or objective about the 
categories "secular" and "religious," difficult philosoph- 
ical issues must be confronted to deal with the 
Louisiana and the Alabama cases. Both raise the prob- 
lematic distinction between science and religion. In the 
Louisiana case, religion seeks to appear as science, so 
that fundamentalist creationism can elevate itself to a 
status that exactly parallels scientific evolution. At the 
level of pure logic, at least, the claim is not so easily 
dismissed. In the Mobile case, science (at least in the 
broader form of a secular public school curriculum) 
can be recharacterized as religion by revealing it to be 
a dogmatic and ideological worldview. Here, too, the 
issue cannot easily be dismissed. Theoretically, then, if 
creation science satisfies a respectable notion of "sci- 
ence," why can't it be made part of the public school 
curriculum? Similarly, if "secular humanism" looks, 
acts, and sounds like a religion, how can we tolerate its 
dogmatic presence in the public schools? 
Despite the presumption of reasoned resolution usu- 
ally associated with legal analysis, it may well be that 
the issues cannot be decided at the level of logic alone. 
Instead, it may be necessary to recover their social 
meaning and, ultimately, to face the contradictions 
necessarily associated with a secular liberal society in 
which the price paid for religious freedom has been the 
privatization and trivialization of the religious experi- 
ence, as well as its exclusion from the arena of signifi- 
cant public affairs. 
The Louisiana case reached the United States Su- 
preme Court under the name of Edwards v. Aguillard. 
This was not the first time that creationism and evolu- 
tion had found themselves pitted against one another 
in court. Nearly everyone has heard of the famous 
Scopes "monkeyn trial in Tennessee in 1925, with its 
dramatic confrontation between the wily rationalist, 
Clarence Darrow, and the grandiloquent defender of 
traditional religion, William Jennings Bryan. Pew 
people realize, however, that the Scopes case never 
resolved whether the teaching of evolution could be  
banned in the schools: the case was ultimately decided 
on  a technicality. 
Not until 1968 did the U. S. Supreme Court decide 
the issue. In  Epperson v. Arkansas the Court  struck 
down, on  establishment grounds, an Arkansas statute 
banning the teaching of evolution in public schools. In 
a snidely dismissive opinion, perhaps reflecting the 
complacency associated with the high point of liberal 
hegemony on  the Warren Court, Justice Fortas charac- 
terized the statute in atavistic terms, a product of 
ignorant religious bigotry. 
Fundamentalists have come to 
understand what the left has been 
pointing out with some consistency: 
Certain liberal presuppositions, 
especially about the primacy of 
"self," the relativity of values, and 
the authority of positivist science, 
are themselves a kind of orthodoxy. 
Justice Black, himself a product of southern 
populism, offered a troubled and prophetic concurring 
opinion in Epperson. Black attacked the view that Dar- 
winism's claim to truth was any more absolute than the 
creationists' religious claims. ("Perhaps no scientist 
would be  willing to take an oath and swear that every- 
thing announced in the Darwinian theory is unques- 
tionably true".) H e  emphasized, moreover, the fact that 
many people still believed that the theory of evolution 
subverted their religious faith. That meant that a state 
which permitted the teaching of evolution was no more 
obviously "neutral" with respect to  religion than a state 
which prohibited it. 
Having lost the power to prohibit the teaching of 
evolution altogether, fundamentalists opted for a new 
ploy, the "cialanced treatment" approach. The basic 
tactic, first adopted in Arkansas and later by Senator 
Keith in Louisiana, was to presuppose two equally 
defensible scientific accounts, and in the interest of 
"academic freedom" to require that they be  given equal 
time. Thus, if evolution were part of the curriculum, it 
would not be  treated as simply "true" but, rather, 
would be  balanced by a supposedly secular version of 
creationism, one carefully cleansed of references to 
God.  
In  1982 a lower court struck down the Arkansas 
statute, with the A.C.L.U. helping the winning side and 
the Moral Majority assisting the losers. Scientists cele- 
brated the victory. A day after the case was decided, 
Senator Keith in Louisiana amended his own bill, which 
was then pending, to make it appear more secular than 
the Arkansas act upon which it had been modeled on. 
H e  also tried, through legislative hearings, to emphasize 
the "academic freedom" issue, promoting an ostensibly 
secular value-pluralisn~. 
These efforts could not, however, erase the well- 
documented reality that "balanced treatment" legisla- 
tion in Louisiana and elsewhere was the product of a 
well-orchestrated, nationwide, fundamentalist political 
program. This became the determinative fact for the 
Supreme Court  in Edwards v. Aguillurd. O n  June 19, 
1987, the Court announced that the Louisiana statute 
violated the establishment clause of the First Amend- 
ment because of its essentially religious purpose. 
Under the test employed by the Court, ostensibly 
neutral legislation may nevertheless be  invalid if 
adopted for a "religious" purpose. Thus, the Court 
must investigate political and social contexts in some 
detail. For example, a law requiring a moment of silence 
during the school day does not, on the surface, bear 
any relationship to religion and might be passed to 
promote calm, thoughtful reflection in the public 
schools. Yet the same law, when urged by religious 
groups which have already been frustrated by the ban 
on  school prayer, could (and has) run afoul of the 
"purpose" test. Thus, in Edwards the Court concluded 
that the claim of secular purpose for the Louisiana 
statute was, in fact, "a sham," its real purpose being to  
"restructure the science curriculum to conform with a 
particular religious viewpoint." 
y seizing on this characterization of purpose, 
the court evaded the two hardest issues in the 
case-the status of creation science as "science" 
and the effect of the evolution curriculum on  the free 
exercise rights of students such as young Keith. These 
points were not lost on  the two dissenting justices, the 
archconservatives Rehnquist and Scalia. In  an annoy- 
ingly clever and sophisticated opinion they raised some 
difficult issues. They questioned the Court's reliance on  
the purpose test, noting the elusive boundary between 
the characterizations "secular" and "religious" and 
stressing as credible Louisiana's desire that its students 
be exposed to competing viewpoints. The dissenters 
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also, not unjustly, characterized most recent establish- 
ment clause decision making as incoherent and chaotic, 
a point which has been made by many legal scholars as 
well. (For example, according to the Supreme Court, a 
state may lend school texts to parochial school students, 
but not tape recorders and maps; it may pay for bus 
transportation to parochial schools, but not pay for 
field trip transportation to secular educational sites.) 
The dissent also pointed out, though not so forcefully 
as had Justice Black in Epperson, the underlying free 
exercise issue ignored by the Court's mode of disposi- 
tion. That issue was destined to reappear. In fact, even 
before the Supreme Court decided Edwards, Judge 
Brevard Hand had decided the Mobile case on March 
4, 1987, under the name of Smith v. Board of Commis- 
sioners of Mobile County. In a lengthy opinion Hand 
announced that the teaching of secular humanism con- 
stitutes an establishment of religion violating the First 
Amendment rights of complaining parents. Although 
Hand's decision was recently (August 27, 1987) over- 
turned by an intermediate appellate court, the case will 
almost surely be  appealed to the Supreme Court. 
In  his decision, Hand actually banned from the 
Alabama public schools forty-four textbooks which, he 
said, promoted the godless "religion" of secular human- 
ism. The case thus represents a nightmare for the liberal 
sensibility, a rising up of outrage and frustration which, 
directed principally against textbooks, comes uncom- 
fortably close to book burning in spirit. The liberal 
temptation, of course, is to quash that spirit, given all 
of its intolerance and closed-mindedness. 
Nevertheless, the Mobile case raises issues which 
liberals cannot ignore. Most significantly, fundamen- 
talists have come to understand what the left has been 
pointing out with some consistency: Certain liberal 
presuppositions, especially about the primacy of "self," 
the relativity of values, and the authority of positivist 
science, are themselves a kind of orthodoxy, not unlike 
religion, an orthodoxy that is found suffocating by 
those who do not share its assumptions. 
Moreover, the public schools, as the training ground 
for future citizens of the United States, have long been 
considered the primary transmitters of liberal values. 
None other than Earl Warren himself, in his famous 
opinion in Brown us. Board of Education, characterized 
public education as the "very foundation of good 
citizenship," a "principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust 
normally to his environment." 
Recent revisionist-left histories of the public school 
system have emphasized the degree to which schools 
have played the role of assimilators, quashers of differ- 
ence, and trainers of "decent," like-minded citizens, 
while also reproducing and stabilizing existing social 
hierarchy. Fundamentalists can hardly be faulted for 
having now reached a similar conclusion. Thus, schools 
are a sensible target of attack by those who do not want 
to be taken over by liberal ideology, which fundamen- 
talists see as simply an alien faith. 
T aking advantage of this perspective, Judge Hand carefully exposed in his opinion the an- tireligious ideological core of public education. 
H e  emphasized the influence of John Dewey, long con- 
sidered the father of modern education. Dewey had 
dismissed religions existing during the 1920s and 1930s 
as "outmoded" and believed society should not guide 
itself by those "old beliefs" but, rather, by "new ethics 
derived from modern scientific doctrine in both the 
biological and physical sciences." Old religion must be 
cast off, he said, and "we must be militant in our new 
religion," with the school system being the key "instru- 
ment" for social improvement. In fact, in an essay 
entitled "Religion in Our  Schools," Dewey outlined 
four basic elements of this new "religion": Right and 
wrong reside only in consequences; there is no cosmic 
guarantee of meaning; children should be  liberated 
from their past and their parents; and "value process- 
ing" is the most wholesome way to proceed through 
life. 
Hand focused particularly on the ideological presup- 
positions of "selfish" psychology, such as Maslow's em- 
phasis on a hierarchy of "needs," with "self-actualiza- 
tion" at the top. Carl Rogers, the psychologist with 
perhaps the most influence on modern education, was 
described as emphasizing "value clarification," prem- 
ised on the view that "only you can judge your own 
values, you are the designer of your life, you are the 
most important person in your life." Thus modern 
psychology teaches us that values are "matters of prefer- 
ence and taste in personal opinion and they cannot be 
known to be right or wrong or true or false. They have 
to do with one's own desires and fulfillments and self- 
satisfaction." Is this science? If not, what is it? Even 
Robert Coles of Harvard, a psychiatrist generally con- 
sidered to be on the political left, testified he felt for 
the parents in their complaints and struggles because 
the textbooks under scrutiny contained a quantity of 
"social and cultural rot." 
As a convincing example of this "rot," Hand de- 
scribed modern history texts as almost entirely omitting 
all mention of religion, even in accounts of the 
abolitionist, women's suffrage, temperance, civil rights, 
and peace movements. "The role of religion in the lives 
of immigrants, and minorities, especially southern 
Blacks, is rarely mentioned," and religion, "where 
treated at all, is generally represented as a private 
matter, only influencing American life at some extraor- 
dinary moments." Those who know that religion has 
played a vital role in American history and also in the 
daily lives of many Americans find such textbooks 
shallow and inaccurate, while those for whom religion 
continues to be of prime importance find them offen- 
sively antireligious. 
Perhaps Judge Hand is straining the legal doctrine in 
declaring secular humanism a religion for establishn~ent 
clause purposes, but his basic point-that the schools 
do  convey a pervasive message of extraordinary 
spiritual shallowness-cannot be ignored, nor can the 
fact that the message is not simply "neutral" and "objec- 
tive" but, rather, deeply ideological and alienating to 
those whose perspective is more spiritually based. 
Others similarly alienated by school requirements in 
the past have, in fact, won court cases under the free 
exercise clause. In 1943 Jehovah's Witnesses were 
exempted by the Supreme Court from the public 
school's compulsory flag salute. For them, the salute 
amounted to bowing down before a "graven image" in 
violation of the Ten Commandments. In 1972 the Court 
exempted Old Order Amish con~munities from other- 
wise applicable compulsory education laws. Those in- 
tensely religious communities found incompatible with 
their way of life the requirement of public education 
beyond the eighth grade. Yet to follow through on the 
logic of Hand's opinion and tailor the curriculum to the 
needs of fundamentalist families would surely run afoul 
of the establishment clause, as the Louisiana case illus- 
trates. Once again, paradoxically, the First Amend- 
ment's guarantee of free exercise seems to require an 
"establishment" prohibited by the same First Amend- 
ment. 
The recent fundamentalist challenge to public school 
education, therefore, raises some valuable points, not 
just about the difficulty of formulating a coherent legal 
doctrine, but also about the nature of modern liberal 
society. As leftists have been pointing out for years, our 
worldview consistently elevates the "self" above com- 
munity and reduces morality to a question of personal 
subjective preference, while finding objectivity only in 
a despiritualized version of nature as a collection of 
positivist "facts." Many fundamentalists (few of whom 
fit the caricature of the ignorant, redneck buffoon, out 
of touch with the modern world) are educated and 
financially successful people who find themselves dis- 
satisfied with the emptiness of a wholly secular society, 
one which defines success only in terms of self-advance- 
ment. The conversion experience, the experience of 
being "born again," brings a new sense of fellowship 
with others in the religious community, along with a 
new sense of moral rootedness and certainty. A love of 
sharing usually replaces selfishness, and the world, both 
social and natural, takes on a spiritual significance 
which cannot be captured by positivist, scientific de- 
scription. Thus, the new life, after conversion, seems 
vastly more rewarding than the sterility associated with 
the dominant culture. 
As Brevard Hand suggested in Mobile, deep religious 
experience cannot be contained within the closed pad- 
dock of pure "privacy." Marx pointed out long ago that 
liberal legal ideology insists upon defining religion, like 
property, as a "private" right, divorced from one's ex- 
perience as "public" citizen. The establishment and 
free exercise clauses are premised on the possibility of 
maintaining that public/private boundary: one is "free" 
to be religious, but only as part of one's private life. 
High school history texts tell us that this ideology of 
privacy was the historical fact about American religion, 
but they do  so only at the expense of accuracy. 
I t is hardly an accident, then, that the single histor- ical example of religion that fits the privacy model, the one all too often hauled out to represent the 
possibility of religious "freedom," is the idiosyncratic 
antinomianism of the great Rhode Island dissident, 
Roger Williams. His separatist version of sectarian Pro- 
testantism maintained its purity only by being rooted 
in unsullied private experience, insulated from an im- 
pure world. In its extreme version, only Williams and 
his wife, by themselves, could commune with God (and 
it has been said, perhaps jokingly, that he wasn't all too 
sure about her). It is somewhat ironic that, in the name 
of "neutrality," legal doctrine has in effect established 
Williams's version of Christianity as the constitutionally 
mandated model of religion itself. 
This narrow model ignores the fact that for most 
people religious conversion means a singular loss of 
private self, and a transformation in one's relationship 
to others that simply cannot manifest itself in a secluded 
self-centered realm. Thus, to take one especially troub- 
ling and politically charged example, a person who 
deeply feels the moral and spiritual significance of fetal 
life finds it difficult to hold that view as a purely 
'private" religious concern, somehow separate from 
and irrelevant to a "public" secular world where fetuses 
are murdered daily. Yet, of course, to one who does not 
share the pro-life religious conviction, the antiabor- 
tionist movement represents only the attempted illegiti- 
mate imposition of a dogmatic moral/religious view on 
what should be a matter for free, private, subjective 
choice. In fact, no less than evolution, the abortion 
issue raises intractable establishment clause problems 
which the courts have generally chosen to ignore. 
The fundamentalists' legal challenge to the public 
school curriculum not only forces us to confront the 
troublesome incoherence of the category "religion" but 
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also compels a similar reexamination of that mainstay 
of modernism-"science." If creation science can dem- 
onstrate that it is, in fact, "science," or if positivist 
science is itself better characterized as a part of liberal 
ideology, how can the latter retain its exclusive 
academic franchise without seriously infringing the reli- 
gious freedom of those who adhere to the former? 
Thus, the fundamentalist challenge has also forced 
scientists to confront the sh>llowness of their tradi- 
tional claims to intellectual authority. The antagonism 
between American fundamentalism and science, which 
did not occur before the turn of the century, was not 
only attributable to the closed-mindedness of fun- 
damentalists in the face of Darwinism. During the early 
part of the twentieth century, scientists were zealous- 
even evangelical-in their claim that natural science 
could uncover all the mysteries of the universe. Social 
and psychological sciences quickly linked themselves 
to natural science in the claim that an understanding of 
natural processes was sufficient for an understanding of 
human nature and society. Science alone was "neutral," 
"objective," and "factual," while religion, a relic of the 
past, could be discarded as biased, subjective, and 
superstitious. 
The eminent evolution scientist 
Stephen Jay Gould has recently 
stressed the extent to which science 
is inevitably immersed in its cultural 
context, with no claim to ahistorical 
objectivity. 
Increasingly, scientists allowed themselves to be por- 
trayed as a new elite priesthood whose expertise ren- 
dered them beyond question or criticism. In the proc- 
ess, scientists of the early twentieth century rejected 
religion at least as much as vice versa. Now, of course, 
especially under the threat of nuclear war, scientists 
themselves are starting to question the sufficiency of a 
scientific method uninformed by moral judgment (C.  P. 
Snow is a leading example), but that insight and self- 
criticism is a recent one within the scientific community. 
The most sophisticated of the creationists have, in 
fact, seized upon real points of vulnerability within 
scientific thought. Positivist science has long been 
based upon a strict subject/object dichotomy-there is 
an "out there" world of objective "facts" to be ob- 
served, tested, and verified according to a single, neut- 
ral scientific methodology. According to the foremost 
philosophical defender of this version of science, Karl 
Popper, the key criterion is "fa1sifiability"-that is, to 
be "scientific" a claim or hypothesis must be subject to 
tests capable of falsifying it. Applying Popper's rule, 
Freudian psychology, for example, fails to qualify as 
"science." 
Crucial to Popper's scheme is the availability of pro- 
cedures for testing the hypothesis; there must be a 
shared understanding about taking measurements and 
interpreting results. At that point, Popper's scheme 
breaks down; he fails to rebut the reality that any 
attempt to objectify falsifiability is no more than a 
matter of convention. Scientific communities, not un- 
like their religious counterparts, are hermeneutic en- 
deavors, communities of tradition organized with refer- 
ence to authoritative texts. Religious creationists have 
their Bible; scientific evolutionists have for their text 
the rocks. Each community has its own interpretative 
criteria, procedures, and conventions, which are ulti- 
mately self-referencing. 
The dynamic of scientific truth is its shifting of 
paradigms, as Thomas Kuhn has demonstrated. The 
continuing worldview of a scientific community means 
much more than its mundane effort to gather and test 
"facts." For example, in evolution science itself there is 
now great tension between the paradigm of "gradualism" 
and that of "punctuated equilibrium" (the latter being 
much more consistent with the possibility of some 
sudden extraterrestrial intervention), or between the 
paradigm of "functionalism" (everything has its purpose) 
and that of just plain whimsy. 
s cience is thus a changing human culture rather than a static objective methodology, and the na- ture of the "facts" being observed cannot be 
divorced from the assumptions of the particular para- 
digm from within which the observation is taking place. 
The theoretical split between subject and object, so 
basic to conventional scientific thought, thus disinteg- 
rates. 
The Kuhnian emphasis on paradigm shift, which 
sophisticated fundamentalists are starting to cite for its 
undermining effect on traditional claims to scientific 
certainty, underscores a point long made by Marxists- 
that scientific methodology cannot claim any objective, 
transcendent separation from social and political life. 
Science is rooted in the culture within which it oper- 
ates, and its underlying presuppositions are always a 
part of that social context. One need only point to the 
insidious history of intelligence testing or eugenics, 
with its strong racist as well as anti-immigrant thrust, 
to show the effect of culture on what is, at any given 
time, considered to be scientific fact. 
One response of the scientific community to fun- 
damentalist attack has been to redescribe science, not 
dogmatically, as a body of objective facts, but rather as 
a continuing quest, a mode of free and critical inquiry, 
in a world always of ultimate uncertainty. There is some 
concern now to stress openness and to maintain toler- 
ance of diverse and outlandish theories. This accords 
with the relativity and uncertainty stressed by, for ex- 
ample, modern physicists, who understand the arti- 
ficiality of the subject/object distinction. 
While fundamentalists employ not only Popper (how 
can evolution be "falsified"?) but the most sophisti- 
cated insights of critical antipositivism to debunk the 
status of evolution as science, the "science" they invoke 
to legitimize the status of creationism is dogmatic, 
outmoded, and essentially premodern. According to 
George Marsden of Calvin College, fundamentalist 
thought is oddly preoccupied with facticity, insistently 
literal, and still rooted in a Baconian philosophical past. 
Their reading of the Bible, for example, is character- 
ized by an insistence of heavy-handed literalism. The 
words of the Bible are "fact," just as nature contains 
facts; theirs is really the old Enlightenment view that 
the two sets of facts are ultimately consistent, both 
revealing somewhat mechanically the perfection of 
God's design. The intellectual background of modern 
fundamentalism thus lies in works such as Paley's Nat- 
ural Theology, the favorite nineteenth-century text dem- 
onstrating the great correspondence between religion 
and an understanding of the natural world. In that 
sense the modern creationists are not really rejecters of 
conventional rationalism but, rather, too eager in their 
embrace of an outmoded, overliteralist form of ration- 
ality. Regrettably, modern fundamentalism has been 
drained of the splendid allegorical thought of the great 
eighteenth-century American evangelical movement. 
The literalism of modern fundamentalism seems a poor 
replacement and often gives it an oppressiveness of 
spirit. 
The defensive posture of fundamentalist creation 
science vis-a-vis evolution has forced its proponents to 
make their demands in the name of a supposed 
"academic freedom" which only barely conceals that 
oppressiveness. In fact, the fundamentalists' dogmatism 
is such that one suspects that, given the opportunity, 
they would happily do away with evolution science 
altogether; all too often, in the name of "good market- 
ing strategy" they have successfully pressured textbook 
editors to omit references to evolution, even in the 
absence of prohibitory legislation. 
Moreover, the creationist ploy rests ultimately upon 
a fallacious duality, reminiscent of the famous Pascal's 
wager (a pragmatic argument for adoption of Christian 
belief premised on the existence of only two choices- 
Christianity and nonbelief). There are for them only 
two possibilities: creation science or, grudgingly, evolu- 
tion science. Unfortunately for that position, creation 
myths abound in human culture generally. Strikingly 
spiritual accounts of humanity's relationship to nature, 
ones that transcend the duality of science and religion, 
appear in many Native American accounts of creation, 
as, for example, that of the Iroquois. Lest one discard 
such accounts as "not science," it is becoming increas- 
ingly clear that one can do "science" worthy of the 
name within a worldview informed by an intense and 
religious spirituality. 
Ironically, the allegorical and spiritual tradition of 
early creationist scientists today finds itself being cele- 
brated by a leading evolution scientist who steadfastly 
proclaims his allegiance to science while challenging 
the rigid orthodoxy of his scientific colleagues. None 
other than the eminent evolution scientist Stephen Jay 
Gould has recently stressed the extent to which science 
is inevitably immersed in its cultural context, with no 
claim to ahistorical objectivity: 
Scientists are not robotic inducing machines that 
infer structures of explanation only from reg- 
ularities observed in natural phenomena.. . . Scien- 
tists are human beings, immersed in culture, and 
struggling with all the curious tools of inference 
that mind permits-from metaphor and analogy to 
all the flights of fruitful imagination that C. S. Peirce 
called "abduction". . . . In any case, objective minds 
do not exist outside culture, so we must make the 
best of our ineluctable embedding. 
Gould's most recent book, Time Arrow, Time's Cycle, 
ends with what John Updike has called a "surprising 
burst" of Christian artwork illustrating the Judeo- 
Christian notion of an "arrow of time," which proceeds 
in a manner simultaneously cyclical and progressive. As 
he describes this artwork, Gould is speaking in a voice 
starkly reminiscent of the greatest American evangelical 
of them all-the eighteenth-century titan, Jonathan Ed- 
wards, whose "History of Redemption" reveals a con- 
ception of time virtually identical to Gould's. 
Gould has explicitly invoked other seventeenth and 
eighteenth-century sources to support his own chal- 
lenge to the oppressive paradigms of functionalism and 
gradualism in evolution science. Gould recently cele- 
brated in a magazine article the work of William Whis- 
ton, an ardent creationist and Isaac Newton's successor 
at Cambridge, who has "descended through history as 
the worst example of religious superstition viewed as 
an impediment to science." Gould argues that Whiston's 
work is no less scientific, or Newtonian, for that matter, 
for its having been informed by an unswerving belief 
in biblical creation. He sees Whiston's work, whatever 
its motivation, as presaging the currently coun- 
terhegemonic paradigm of "punctuated equilibrium," 
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as opposed to "gradualism." (Whiston, for instance, 
attributed environmental change to the periodic ap- 
pearance of comets; modern scientists think maybe 
meteorites did it.) 
Despite his respect for early Christian creationist 
scientists, Gould has no sympathy for their modern 
literalist fundamentalist would-be counterparts. He tes- 
tified against them in the Arkansas case that preceded 
Edwards v. Agudlard, celebrates their legal defeats, and 
calls their science a "sham." Paradoxically, for Gould, 
whose own critique of scientific presumption is so 
careful and sophisticated, the bottom line is that "sci- 
ence has taught us some things with confidence," while 
creation science, on the other hand, is "false." Thus, 
Gould retreats behind the convenient wall that sepa- 
rates "science" from "religion." At this point he is on 
the shaky epistemological ground we have surveyed 
before. 
T he lines that divide the secular from the reli- gious, or science from religion, are, of course, indeterminate, incoherent, and indefensible. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court got it right in Ed- 
wards v. Aguillard, and for as close to the right reason 
as that body could articulate. The real issue is not 
epistemology; it is politics. It is only at the abstract 
level of logic that creation science and evolution are 
fungible curricular units, or that secular humanism is 
as much a religion as Roman Catholicism. 
As often as law seeks to resolve issues through appeal 
to abstraction, its practitioners discover that they must 
-seek guidance in the messy particularity of context. 
The point, evocative of Oliver Wendell Holmes's fa- 
mous quip ("The life of the law has not been logic; it 
has been experience"), is as applicable to religion cases 
as it is to any others. The questions to be asked about 
these struggles between fundamentalists and the public 
schools are: Who are the proponents and why are they 
doing what they are doing? What will happen if they 
succeed? What else is planned? What is the larger 
political program of which these challenges are just a 
part? Whose program is it? 
The Supreme Court, in Edwards, through its quest 
for the "purpose" behind the "balanced treatment" law, 
sought political context and found it in the particular 
Louisiana legislative history and, as stressed by retiring 
justice Lewis Powell and Reagan appointee Justice 
Sandra Day O'Connor, in the nationwide, organized, 
fundamentalist efforts to legitimize "creation science." 
The real political implications of both "creation sci- 
ence" and the attack on "secular humanism," however, 
reach well beyond what any Supreme Court justice was 
willing to acknowledge. Undeniably, there are particu- 
lar and sincere fundamentalists who feel themselves 
suffocated by secular liberal orthodoxy. Equally unde- 
niably, however, they have allowed their demand for 
"accommodation" to be appropriated and exploited by 
those associated with the most extreme right wing of the 
Reagan legal agenda, people like Meese and Reynolds 
in the "Justice" Department. In the current social cli- 
mate, "accommodation" has become inseparable from 
a political agenda that would also include the rein- 
troduction of school prayer, the elimination of affirma- 
tive action, the curtailment of free speech, the perpe- 
tuation of legal disabilities for gays and lesbians, the 
illegality of abortions, and the authority of states to 
disregard the protections of the Bill of Rights al- 
together-in short, the right-wing "revolution" epito- 
mized by the nomination of Robert Bork to the Su- 
preme Court. 
This is not to say that our current postliberal society 
offers much to satisfy our spiritual needs. As the right 
knows all too well, we must confront the sterility of our 
modern culture, its rampant narcissism, its oppressively 
false dualities (e. g., public and private, science and 
religion), and its pervasive alienation. Nevertheless, a 
disturbing parallel comes to mind. It is all too ugly a 
fact of history that Nazi success in Germany was in 
part based upon an accurate perception that German 
bourgeois culture offered little to satisfy the German 
yearning for community and for moral significance. 
The anger and frustration of those alienated by German 
liberalism were not inauthentic, even though they were 
too easily manipulated into hysterical nationalism. Our 
task now is to recognize and hold in check the potential 
for fascism created by a similar alienation in our own 
culture, as it is experienced by fundamentalists who 
feel disaffected from America's orthodoxy of sec- 
ularism. Yet we must do so with a political agenda that 
draws on something other than a mindless resort to the 
same liberal cliches that created the spiritual void in 
which we live today. 0 
